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A Broken System: 
Failures of the Religious Regulatory System in the 
People’s Republic of China* 
The system for regulating religion in the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC” or “China”) has faced increasing domestic and 
international criticism in recent years.1 However, there has been 
little, if any, improvement in the regulation or protection of religious 
freedoms in the PRC during the past decades.2 This failure to act in 
the face of increased criticism and international pressure has been 
attributed to the continued policy of the Communist Party of China 
(“CPC” or “Party”) to bring religious organizations under its 
control.3 This Comment will show that the current system of 
religious regulation not only fails to promote internationally 
recognized principles of religious freedom, but also is 
counterproductive to CPC and PRC interests as it contributes to the 
 
* An early draft of this Comment was partially adopted for publication in another work with 
the help of additional authors. See Liu Peng, Brett G. Scharffs & Carl Hollan, Constitutional, 
Legislative and Regulatory Change Regarding Religion in China, in LAW, RELIGION, 
CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF RELIGION, EQUAL TREATMENT, AND THE LAW 247 (Cristiana 
Cianitto, Cole Durham Jr., Sivio Ferrari & Donlu Thayer eds., 2013). Although both works 
address the history and current issues of China’s policies toward religion, this Comment 
provides an expanded treatment of those issues and China’s regulatory system. Further, this 
Comment proposes an alternative solution to those offered in the other work, one based on 
China’s regulatory system. References will be made throughout this Comment to those 
sections that have been published in the other work. 
 1. The U.S. State Council has designated China as a “Country of Particular Concern” 
since 1999 due to state-sanctioned religious persecution. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG 
KONG, AND MACAU) (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/502105ce50.html. 
 2. See generally Fuk-Tsang Ying, New Wine in Old Wineskins: An Appraisal of Religious 
Legislation in China and the Regulations on Religious Affairs of 2005, 34 RELIGION, ST. & 
SOC’Y 347 (2006). 
 3. See YOSHIKO ASHIWA & DAVID L. WANK, MAKING RELIGION, MAKING THE STATE: 
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN MODERN CHINA 9 (2009). 
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growth of the illegal, underground, and consequently unregulated 
practice of religion. 
Part I of this Comment will outline the development of the 
religious regulatory system in China since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China. Part II will review the current system of 
religious regulation. Part III will address CPC and PRC policies on 
religious regulation and the interests and goals of the CPC and PRC. 
Part IV will illustrate the failures of the current regulatory system and 
policies in achieving the interests of the CPC and PRC through the 
history of the Falun Gong in the PRC. Finally, a solution which 
takes into account both CPC and PRC interests and international 
standards of religious freedom protection will be proposed. 
I. A PRIMER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Not unlike the histories of religion in other regions, the history 
of religion in China is comprised of a patchwork of timelines of both 
benevolence and sordid blunders. As in Europe, many of the 
religious philosophies that have flourished in China are not native to 
China.4 However, to draw similar conclusions about Chinese 
attitudes towards religion by comparing China with other regions 
would be a mistake. Perhaps most influential in the development of 
PRC and CPC policy has been the history of religion in China 
during the 150-year period immediately preceding the ascension of 
the Communist Party. During this time, organized religious societies 
have been influential factors in civil wars,5 rebellions,6 corrupt 
 
 4. Of the current officially recognized religions in China (Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, 
Catholicism [Quasi-Roman Catholic], and Christianity [Protestantism]), only Daoism is a 
native Chinese religion (Confucianism is not recognized as a religion in China, though a 
debate continues as to whether Confucianism is a religion or a philosophy). 
 5. See generally JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD’S CHINESE SON: THE TAIPING 
HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF HONG XIUQUAN (1996) (describing the Taiping Rebellion, a civil 
war lasting from 1845 to 1864 that claimed the lives of an estimated 20 million Chinese; the 
movement was rooted in Christianity and its supporters promulgated their quasi-Christian 
views in conquered territories). 
 6. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 189–93 (3d ed. 
1990) (providing a brief overview of the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873), when the Hui 
Muslims of western China fought against the central government, and the Dungan Revolt 
(1862–1877), another Muslim uprising in western China that threatened Chinese control); see 
DO NOT DELETE 8/17/2015 8:07 PM 
733 A Broken System 
 
 
 735 
 
 
principles,7 the spread of foreign influence,8 and the decline of 
Chinese traditions and culture.9 When these factors are combined 
with Communist ideology on religion, there is little wonder that the 
CPC’s initial policies were unfavorable and intolerant of organized 
religious groups and, at times, even of unorganized religious 
practice. During its sixty-year history, PRC and CPC policy has 
vacillated between attempts to control religious organizations and 
attempts to eradicate religion from the lives of Chinese citizens. 
A. 1949–1966: Communism and Religion with Chinese 
Characteristics 
From the ashes of political upheaval, instability, foreign 
domination, and civil war, the Chinese Communist Party and the 
People’s Republic of China rose as Mao Zedong proclaimed that 
China had “stood up.”10 Despite initial promises that religious 
freedom would be protected and that religious organization would 
be left unfettered by the continuing Communist revolutionary 
struggle,11 Mao and the Communists immediately undertook to 
 
also id. at 231–35 (describing the Boxer Rebellion (1898–1901), which was a Daoist/Qi-
gong/Traditionalist uprising with strong religious themes, and showing how the combined 
weakness of the central government and the strength of the Boxers eventually led to the 
Emperor fleeing Beijing and foreign troops quelling the rebellion). 
 7. Id. at 414–15 (describing how Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist 
government, altered traditional Confucian Principles to develop some of his ideologies). 
 8. See W. TRAVIS HANES III & FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION 
OF ONE EMPIRE AND THE CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 222 (2002). As Western nations 
engaged in “gunboat diplomacy” and forced the Chinese to enter unequal treaties, the foreign 
nations commonly required the Chinese government to allow Christian missionaries the 
freedom to travel and proselyte within China. 
 9. Christian missionaries invited or required Chinese citizens to stop ancestor worship, 
the worship of idols, polygamy, foot-binding, temple employment, and vegetarian vows. See 
Eric Reindeers, Blessed are the Meat Eaters: Christian Antivegitarianism and the Missionary 
Encounter with Chinese Buddhism, 12 POSITIONS 509, 525 (2004). 
 10. DAVID SCOTT, CHINA STANDS UP 1 (2007) (Immediately prior to the official 
founding of the PRC, on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared to the Chinese people that 
China had stood up and would never again be an insulted nation.). 
 11. See JOHN CRAIG WILLIAM KEATING, A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN COMMUNIST 
CHINA: MOORE MEMORIAL CHURCH SHANGHAI, 1949–1989, at 79 (2012) (stating that 
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reform every aspect of Chinese life, including religious organizations, 
dogma, and adherents’ beliefs.12 Moreover, early CPC leaders saw 
organized religion as posing a direct threat to Communist ideals of 
self-determinative Chinese sovereignty (or a Chinese rule absent 
foreign intervention or control) and undivided loyalty to 
Communism because of the close ties between religion and foreign 
influence and because religious believers openly displayed loyalty to a 
social organization other than the Communist Party. 
In order to fight these threats of foreign influence and divided 
loyalty, the Communist Party repurposed the United Front Work 
Department (“UFWD”) in 1940.13 The UFWD was first formed 
when the Communists found themselves necessarily allied with the 
Kuomingtang Nationalists to fight warlord generals following the fall 
of the Qing Empire and later to fight the Japanese during World 
War II.14 The UFWD is a Party Department that falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The 
UFWD was originally created, as its name suggests, as a Party 
structure that would be responsible for controlling contact with 
extra-Party (Nationalist) leaders. The Department would ensure that 
contact with these leaders would be uniform, or united, thereby 
guaranteeing that struggles with these enemies via a “united front” 
would result in Communist success. In 1940, the Department was 
retooled to not only control contact with the Nationalists, but also 
to control contact with the new Communist enemy; all extra-
Communist political parties and groups; locally powerful cliques; 
friendly armies; and political, economic, and social organizations and 
figures (specifically including religions).15 
When the People’s Republic of China was officially established in 
1949, the Communist Party formed the PRC government. The PRC 
 
missionaries and parishioners were initially optimistic about relations with the PRC 
government, hoping to maintain a “peaceful coexistence”). 
 12. Id. at 90; see also Beatrice K. F. Leung, China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of 
Managing Religious Activity, 184 CHINA Q. 894, 899 (2005) [hereinafter Leung, Managing 
Religious Activity] (describing how regulations on time and location of religious observance 
restricted the free exercise of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Daoist adherents). 
 13. See LYMAN P. VAN SLYKE, ENEMIES AND FRIENDS: THE UNITED FRONT IN 
CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY 268 (1967). 
 14. Id. at 1–2. 
 15. See id. at 268. 
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government was created to rule as sovereign over China, though, in 
reality, Communist Party leaders took up virtually all PRC 
government posts and used the PRC government as a means to 
actuate Party rule. With the creation of the PRC government came 
the creation of the Religious Affairs Bureau (“RAB”), a government 
agency which would oversee religious adherents and religious 
organizations. The RAB was created in accordance with the PRC 
constitutional requirements and fell within the jurisdiction of the 
State Department.16 Though falling within the jurisdiction of the 
State Department, the RAB was primarily accountable to the 
UFWD.17 The RAB was responsible for implementing the policy the 
UFWD created. Thus, religious organizations seeking legal entity 
status would need to register through the RAB according to the 
requirements the UFWD established. 
Following their rise to power, one of the first acts of the CPC 
and RAB was to expel all foreign missionaries from China.18 By 1952 
all foreign missionaries had left China.19 After former missionaries 
and Western religious society leaders returned home, the CPC 
pressed for China to move past Christianity towards the Communist 
ideal of scientific atheism. Chinese scholars sought to undermine 
Chinese ties to Christianity by equating Christianity with foreign 
imperialism, foreign domination, the unequal treaties of the 
nineteenth century, the defeated Nationalist government, and 
“cultural imperialism.”20 
The expulsion of foreign missionaries from China had limited 
effect in fulfilling CPC interests. The concern of divided loyalties, as 
well as concerns about the inability of the CPC to control religious 
groups’ loyalties, led to another, far more sweeping, change in CPC 
policy toward religion in China. A well-intentioned, though perhaps 
 
 16. See PHILIP L. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND: PROTESTANT 
CHRISTIANITY, THE THREE-SELF MOVEMENT, AND CHINA’S UNITED FRONT 70–71 (2011) 
[hereinafter WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 60. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 62. 
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mal-aligned, Christian Socialist with close ties to the Communist 
Party provided the ultimate solution that would allow the 
Communists to eliminate foreign influence over religious believers 
and ensure that religious believers’ primary loyalties lie with the 
Party. Reviving an old exit strategy drafted by several Western 
missionaries in 189221 because many Christian churches were facing 
certain dissolution due to the block of foreign financial assets sent to 
China,22 Wu Yaozong (commonly referred to by his “Western” name 
of Y.T. Wu) began advocating a strategy to ensure the survival of 
Christianity in Communist China in 1948.23 In May 1950, Wu and 
several other Christian leaders met three separate times with the 
premier of the newly-formed People’s Republic of China, Zhou 
Enlai, and discussed plans to organize what has come to be known as 
the “Three-Self Patriotic Movement” (the “TSPM”).24 In July 1950, 
Wu and other Christians published “The Christian Manifesto,” a 
political treatise with the principle theme of anti-imperialism.25 The 
Manifesto “stressed the fact that in the past imperialism has made use 
of Christianity, and the necessity to purge imperialistic influences 
from within Christianity itself.”26 To accomplish this purge of 
imperialistic influences, the movement embraced three basic 
principles: “self-governance,” “self-support,” and “self-
promulgation.”27 This total severance of foreign ties would mean 
that Chinese Christians could only look to Chinese nationals for 
ultimate terrestrial religious authority; they would reject any support 
or financial aid from foreign sources; and Chinese Christianity would 
promulgate itself without the input or aid of foreign missionaries.28 
 
 21. See Paul Grant, The Three Self Patriotic Movement in China, THE NETWORK FOR 
STRATEGIC MISSIONS (Jan. 1, 2007), 
http://www.strategicnetwork.org/index.php?loc=kb&view=v&i
d=8345&printerfriendly=Y&lang=. 
 22. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 89. 
 23. See GAO WANGZHI, CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA: FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
TO THE PRESENT 344 (1999). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 343–44. 
 26. Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 250. 
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While Wu and his “Christian Manifesto” faced sharp criticism 
from Chinese Christians for being “too radical,”29 half of the 
Chinese Christian population (about 400,000 of the 700,000 total 
Christian believers) accepted the manifesto and the underlying 
principles of self-sufficiency by 1952.30 Wu’s resulting popularity and 
clout with CPC officials led to the emergence of the TSPM as the 
premier Christian ecclesiastical authority in China.31 The number of 
Christians who would not align with the Party-sponsored TSPM 
dwindled as anti-American movements, motivated by American 
involvement in the Korean War, the Three-Anti’s Movement, and 
the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries resulted in 
public accusation sessions, labor reform sentences, or the execution 
of anyone accused of espousing non-Communist ideologies.32 The 
TSPM’s role in the Chinese religious regulation model was solidified 
in 1958 when the CPC officially dissolved all Protestant sects and 
unified all Protestant churches as a single faith in an attempt to 
collectivize religious organizations in the same way all other aspects 
of Chinese life would be collectivized.33 
The changes in the Chinese Protestant Church would soon 
spread to other religious organizations. Not long after the release of 
the TSPM’s “Christian Manifesto,” the Party sought out and tried to 
mobilize Catholic leaders to endorse the same “three-self” principles 
Wu and the Protestants had embraced.34 Land Reform Campaigns 
 
 29. GAO, supra note 23, at 344. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. Wu has been strongly criticized by his contemporaries and modern day historians 
alike for his role in the creation of a Communist-controlled Christian church. In the words of 
his contemporary: “Wu has been branded by some a heretic or an anti-Christ, while others 
would question his intentions and integrity as a Christian and wonder if he has not betrayed his 
faith through the close alliance with the Communist government.” Id. at 338. His high 
position in the Communist-TSPM hierarchy serves as confirmation for some that his motives in 
leading the Chinese Christian revolution were less than pure. 
 32. See SEBASTIAN HEILMANN & ELIZABETH J. PERRY, MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 145 (2011). 
 33. See GAO, supra note 23, at 347; see also Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 
250–51. 
 34. See BEATRICE K. F. LEUNG & WILLIAM T. LIU, CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
CONFLICT:1949–2001 84, 86–87 (2004). 
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reallocated much of the property held by the Catholic Church into 
PRC and Party control.35 The Anti-Rightist movements of the 1950s 
and the anti-foreigner sentiment were used to further discredit the 
Catholic clergy and purge the Chinese Catholic Church of leaders 
who would not conform to PRC and Party policy.36 
In 1956, the only four Chinese Catholic bishops who were not 
then in prison went to Beijing and met with PRC Premier Zhou 
Enlai. Zhou promised that if the Chinese Catholic Church severed 
ties with the Vatican, Chinese Catholics would be free to practice 
their religion in peace.37 These four bishops organized a nationwide 
meeting on July 15, 1957, and declared the formation of the 
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (“CCPA”).38 These bishops 
took upon themselves the leadership positions in the CCPA and 
released a statement severing any relationship between the CCPA 
and the Vatican and any loyalty of the Chinese Catholic Church to 
the Holy See. The following year, the Party’s UFWD and the PRC’s 
RAB authorized the CCPA to ordain two bishops and eleven priests 
without the Vatican’s approval. Pope Pius XII responded in June 
1958 by condemning the CCPA and the Chinese Catholic Church,39 
establishing a strained relationship between the Chinese Catholic 
Church and the Vatican that has continued for the past fifty-six 
years. 
Buddhism and Daoism lacked the strong hierarchical structures 
of the Catholic and other Christian faiths; thus, the Party and the 
PRC had little trouble in establishing an oversight organization to 
control religious believers.40 The Party could not rely on foreign ties 
in their attacks of Buddhism and Daoism, so they instead attacked 
the two belief systems as being vestiges of the feudal society China 
sought to leave behind, as shelters for the Kuomingtang rebels, and 
as remnants of the capitalist class system.41 It was fairly simple for the 
Party to establish both the China Taoist Association and Buddhist 
 
 35. Id. at 88. 
 36. See id.; see also Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 899–900. 
 37. See LEUNG & LIU, supra note 34, at 89. 
 38. Id. at 90. 
 39. Id. at 96. 
 40. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12. 
 41. See id. 
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Association of China as oversight bodies to regulate the religious 
practice of their believers. These associations were organized in 1953 
and subscribed to the same “three-self” principles as the TSPM 
Protestant Church.42 
The organization of the Chinese Muslims in western China was 
accomplished through a slightly different methodology. UFWD and 
PRC leaders established the Islamic Association of China (“IAC”) in 
1953.43 State and Party favoritism gave the IAC the advantage as 
they gradually grew and absorbed existing Muslim associations, 
Muslim (shariah) courts, and Muslim schools. Similar to the 
regulations limiting other faiths, “[t]he state . . . [began] to play a 
significant role in shaping what elements of Islam were to be 
considered legal, legitimate, and ‘real’ and what practices were illegal 
and subversive acts of superstition, and outside the narrowed scope 
of ‘true’ Islam.”44 
With these Patriotic Religious Associations established, the 
Communist Party had created the framework for the control of 
religious observance in the People’s Republic of China. The UFWD 
and RAB worked within this framework to attempt to build a system 
by which they could control all religious activity in China.45 Aside 
from a four year span from 1958 to 1962 when the Islamic 
Association of China was dissolved,46 the UFWD and RAB sought to 
control religious believers through control of the Patriotic Religious 
Associations. Control was established by encouraging turmoil within 
these associations, by selecting and promoting leadership that was 
loyal to the Communist cause, and through political 
indoctrination.47 Moreover, Chinese citizens understood that 
 
 42. See André Laliberté, The Political Consequences of Religious Revival in the People’s 
Republic of China, ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV., Jan. 2004, at 31. 
 43. Stephen E. Hess, Islam, Local Elites, and China’s Missteps in Integrating the Uyghur 
Nation, USAK Y.B. INT’L POL. & L. 407, 412 (2010). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 899–900. 
 46. See Hess, supra note 43. 
 47. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900 (leadership 
selection); GEORGE N. PATTERSON, CHRISTIANITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 87 (1969) 
(political indoctrination). 
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religious believers would always be second-class citizens. “To the 
question, ‘Can a Christian believe in the New Democracy?’ [Chinese 
Communist movement] the answer was yes: ‘Yes . . . but he cannot 
be an official worker in the party or the government.’”48 
 
Figure 1: The framework of control over religious believers. The proper titles of certain 
divisions may vary by locations (e.g., the Shanghai City government operates at the level of 
other provinces, and intra-city divisions exist down to the neighborhood/street level). While 
never fully realized in all provinces, this framework shows the relationships of control that were 
established to regulate religious freedom. 
B. 1966–1979: The Dissolution of the Regulatory System 
Beginning as early as 1963, leftist extremists began to persecute 
religious adherents for their disloyalty towards Communist ideals.49 
Following a formal notice released by the highest Party body 
denouncing certain anti-Maoists, the extreme left-wing movement 
exploded across China.50 This “Great Proletariat Cultural 
Revolution”51 thrust China into a state of anarchy as groups of 
 
 48. PATTERSON, supra note 47, at 59. 
 49. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 158. 
 50. See id. at 139. 
 51. Id. 
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student-aged “Red Guards” roamed the country seeking to destroy 
the “four olds”: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. 
“Religion was one of the early targets of the ‘Red Guards,’ because it 
typified the problem of the ‘four olds.’”52 Unlike previous anti-
rightist campaigns, the Red Guards attacked both official and 
unofficial religious organizations. In August 1966, the Red Guards 
shut down all religious centers throughout the country, regardless of 
their standing with the Communist Party. The Red Guards “stormed 
the headquarters of the [Protestant] TSPM . . . with axes and 
herd[ed] the entire staff together to confess their ‘crimes.’”53 The 
UWFD, RAB, and all Patriotic Religious Associations were dissolved 
and all religious practices were driven underground.54 
Any citizen found to be or accused of being a religious believer 
was in danger of persecution by the Red Guard. Scriptures were 
burned, relics were destroyed, and believers were forced to endure 
public accusation sessions and torture. The Red Guard also forced 
celibate leaders to marry, Muslims to eat pork or raise pigs, and 
Christians to deny their faith.55 Many religious leaders and religious 
believers were imprisoned, tortured, or executed.56 Official records 
from this time are sparse on information;57 however, personal 
histories indicate that most religious believers in China were 
significantly affected by the Cultural Revolution. Religious leaders 
who avoided more significant persecution did so by proving 
connections with the Communist Party.58 Ironically, many who 
survived the Cultural Revolution have said that the persecution only 
served to strengthen their religious resolve.59 
 
 52. PHILIP L. WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA: K.H. TING AND 
THE CHINESE CHURCH 171 (2007) [hereinafter WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING 
CHRISTIANITY]. 
 53. KEATING, supra note 11, at 142. 
 54. See JAMES MILLER, CHINESE RELIGIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 182 
(2006); WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 69–70. 
 55. See WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 171. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 145. 
 58. See id. at 142–43. 
 59. See WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 185. 
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C. 1979–2004: Reconstruction of the Religious Regulatory Structure 
Following the death of Mao in 1976, the new CPC and PRC 
leader, Deng Xiaoping, set about to rebuild China. During the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng began 
to re-establish the framework for religious control that had been 
dissolved during the Cultural Revolution. During this session, the 
CPC officially re-created the UFWD and RAB.60 In 1980 the 
Patriotic Religious Associations were re-established, “in line with the 
resumption of the state’s policy of co-opting religion into patriotic, 
state-controlled religious orders.”61 Religious adherents set about 
rebuilding their religious institutions while the CPC sought an 
answer for dealing with “the religious question” in China.62 In 
answer to the “religious question,” the Central Committee of the 
CPC released “Document No. 19” in 1982.63 This document 
acknowledged that “the long-term influence of religion among a 
part of the people in a Socialist society cannot be avoided,” but also 
continued to assert that “[r]eligion will eventually disappear from 
human history.”64 
The Central Committee explained that they had “restored the 
activities of the patriotic religious associations” and that 
the Party’s and government’s basic task in its religious work will be 
to firmly implement and carry out its policy of freedom of religious 
belief; to consolidate and expand the patriotic political alliance in 
each ethnic religious group; to strengthen education in patriotism 
and Socialism among them, and to bring into play positive 
elements among them in order to build a modern and powerful 
Socialist state.65 
 
 60. See id. at 68–71. 
 61. Hess, supra note 43, at 414; see also WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, 
supra note 16, at 188–89. 
 62. Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Document 19, the Basic Viewpoint 
on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period, translated in DONALD 
MACINNIS, RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8–26 (1989), available at 
http://www.purdue.edu/crcs/itemResources/PRCDoc/pdf/Document_no._19_1982.pdf. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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In short, the Communist Party sought to rebuild the framework 
of control that had existed during the 1950s, encourage religious 
adherents to submit to the authority of the patriotic religious 
associations, and to use the influence of the CPC over these religious 
associations to further Communist ideologies and principles. 
However, the Party maintained that “[t]he basic policy the Party has 
adopted toward the religious question is that of respect for and 
protection of the freedom of religious belief.”66 
It was also in 1982 that the PRC adopted a new constitution.67 
Included in the new constitution was Article 36, which purports to 
guarantee religious freedoms for citizens of the PRC.68 This 
provision states that citizens enjoy the freedom to either believe in or 
not believe in religion; however, the practice of religion is limited to 
the practice of “normal religious activities.”69 “Normal religious 
activities” are not defined in the constitution; therefore, the 
normalcy of religious activity has been defined by UFWD policy and 
RAB administration.70 Moreover, the constitution reaffirms the 
ideals of the three-self movement for religious organizations.71 
This regulatory framework ultimately led to the development of 
China’s current unique religious market. Yang Fenggang’s influential 
essay on the red, black, and gray markets of religion in China offers 
an excellent model for understanding the religious market in 
 
 66. Id.; Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
 67. See WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 212. 
 68. XIANFA art. 36 (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 
Article 36. Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious 
belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against 
citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal 
religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that 
disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational 
system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any 
foreign domination. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Fenggang Yang, The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China, 47 
SOC. Q. 93, 101 (2006). 
 71. See XIANFA (1982) (China). 
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China.72 Yang describes religious organizations as belonging to one 
of three separate markets: the red market, which consists of religious 
organizations aligned with the CPC-sponsored patriotic religious 
associations; the black market, which consists of religious 
organizations that the PRC government has officially banned; and 
the gray market, which consists of religious organizations that are 
not aligned with the patriotic religious associations, but not officially 
banned, or religious organizations aligned with patriotic religious 
associations acting outside legal boundaries.73 This model for 
understanding religious regulation and practice is helpful for those 
who are not familiar with the complexities of Chinese law that is 
often applied unequally according to unspoken, unpublished 
principles outsiders may not know. 
While the structure of the religious regulatory system in China 
has seen little change since the early 1980s, the policies surrounding 
religion have changed dramatically. In the 1980s, following the 
beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, 
CPC leaders became increasingly worried about “antirevolutionary 
activities that are undertaken under the cloak of religion,” and 
foreigners and destabilizing groups “us[ing] religion to turn [their] 
young people against [them].”74 Unfortunately for the CPC leaders 
who sought to tighten the controls of the UFWD and the State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (“SARA”) over these potentially 
subversive organizations, one of the major effects of the Cultural 
Revolution was that religious organizations were driven 
underground.75 In response, CPC officials vacillated between liberal 
allowances of religious freedom and tightened policies to gain the 
loyalty of underground religious groups, to appease Western 
demands, and to ensure control over religious groups.76 The UFWD 
and RAB also approved the creation of several new Official Religious 
 
 72. See generally Yang, supra note 70, at 101. 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. Beatrice K. F. Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts with China, 28 RELIGION, ST. & 
SOC’Y 185, 186 (2010) [hereinafter Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts]. 
 75. Id. at 187. 
 76. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 182–83; WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING 
CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 220. 
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Associations, raising the total number of Party-approved religious 
associations to eight.77 
Along with the policy reforms of the 1980s came an explosion in 
religious membership, particularly in Catholic and Protestant 
membership. The PRC estimated that there were approximately 
three million Catholics and three million Protestants in China in 
1982.78 By 1994, the number of Catholics in China had increased to 
over twelve million, with membership split between the official 
Patriotic Religious Association and underground Catholic 
churches.79 Protestant church membership saw a later but steady rise 
in membership, increasing to six million in 1993, to ten million in 
1997, and to over fourteen million in 2004.80 Much to the 
disappointment of UFWD and RAB officials, a large percentage of 
these new religious members joined churches led by religious clergy 
who had been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution, who were 
released during the era of reform, and who ignored CPC directives 
and chose to operate within the ‘gray market.’81 
In response to increased worries by CPC leadership about the 
growth of religious groups and their potential to harbor subversive 
elements that might undermine CPC control, restrictions on 
religious freedom saw a general increase throughout the early 
1990s.82 The main thrust of these regulations was to crack down on 
unofficial religious organizations and to encourage the patriotic 
religious associations to further “adapt to the socialist regime.”83 
Official clergymen were targeted by the Party and State and were 
sent to RAB conferences for indoctrination seminars, while unofficial 
 
 77. WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 221–22; see also 
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900. 
 78. Yang, supra note 70, at 103. 
 79. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 905. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 902; see also Hongyi Harry Lai, The Religious Revival in China, 18 
COPENHAGEN J. OF ASIAN STUD. 40, 48 (2003) (stating that in the early 1990s it was 
estimated that less than one-fifth of Catholics in China attended the officially recognized 
Patriotic Church). 
 82. Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts, supra note 74, at 187. 
 83. Id. 
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clergy were arrested.84 Jiang Zemin, then the CPC and PRC leader, 
explained to the UFWD what this adaptation to the socialist regime 
would entail: “This type of adaptation does not require religious 
adherents to abandon theism and religious beliefs. . . . [Rather,] 
[t]hey should alter those religious systems and doctrines which do 
not go along with socialism . . . .”85 During this same period there 
were periodic crackdowns against Buddhists in Tibet and Muslims in 
Xinjiang, which the PRC government said were instigated by 
“religious activities [that] threatened national security.”86 
A similar nationwide regulatory tightening on unofficial religious 
organizations occurred just a few years later after the explosion of the 
Falun Gong movement and the subsequent crackdown by CPC and 
by PRC authorities to suppress the movement.87 Fenggang Yang 
asserts that the increased regulation of religious practice during this 
period has directly led to the burgeoning of the “gray” and “black” 
religious organizations during this same time.88 Whether or not CPC 
leaders saw this same correlation, in December 2001 Jiang Zemin 
spoke to a group of CPC and PRC officials and dramatically changed 
CPC religious policy. In his speech, Jiang spoke of religion as a 
phenomenon that will survive for a long time and recognized that 
religion may have a significant social stabilizing effect.89 This change 
in religious policy would lead to a new era of religious regulation. 
D. Recent Developments in Religious Regulation 
After Jiang Zemin stepped down from power, Hu Jintao 
assumed the top position in both the Communist Party and PRC 
government. Hu’s tenure was defined by some as “responsive 
authoritarianism”: a more populist, accountable, and law-based 
system of governance that sought to maintain the status quo where 
possible, but reacted authoritatively in response to social problems.90 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 906. 
 87. Yang, supra note 70, at 113. 
 88. Id. at 99. 
 89. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 910. 
 90. THOMAS LUM & HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CHINA: TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 (2009). 
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During Hu’s tenure, religious activity in both registered and 
unregistered religious organizations increased.91 Hu advocated for all 
Chinese citizens, including religious citizens, to promote the 
development of a “harmonious society” in an attempt to increase the 
social stability of China and the legitimacy of the Communist 
Party.92 Communist leaders also began “to acknowledge the positive 
role that Christianity can play in promoting social development, yet 
remain[ed] deeply suspicious and fearful of its potential power as a 
source of autonomous organization.”93 As Hu prepared to step 
down and appoint a new generation of leaders in 2012, many 
scholars in China were optimistic that Xi Jinping, the front-runner 
for assuming Hu’s position, would implement religious reforms that 
would lead to greater religious freedom in China. However, 
following Xi Jinping’s appointment to power, China has increased, 
not decreased, the restriction of religious practice in China. 
During 2014 in particular, it seems that an unpublished policy 
change originating in the highest echelons of Communist leadership 
has resulted in a renewed crackdown on religious organizations. 
More troubling, however, is that these recent waves of crackdowns 
have resulted in the suppression of black-market religious 
organizations, gray-market religious organizations, and even the 
officially and legally recognized red-market religious organizations. 
One black-market religious group that was specifically targeted in 
2014 is the Eastern Lightning Church, or the Church of Almighty 
God. Although the church was defined as a “heretical cult” during 
the mid-1990s, suppression of the group was renewed after May 28, 
2014. On that day, six members of the Eastern Lightning Church 
approached a woman in a McDonald’s restaurant in Shandong 
Province and asked for her phone number. When the woman 
refused, the believers beat the woman to death in the restaurant.94 
 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. Holbig, Heike, Remaking the CCP’s Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits 
under Hu Jintao, 38 J. OF CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 35, 50–51. 
 93. See LUM & FISCHER, supra note 90, at 13. 
 94. 1,500 Cult Members Arrested in Past Two Years, China Says After McDonald’s 
Killing, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 11, 2014), 
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However, much more troubling have been the recent 
crackdowns against formally recognized or formerly formally 
recognized religious organizations during 2014. The first significant 
suppression began in late 2013, when a pastor in Henan Province 
was told by local authorities that officials intended to repossess the 
property where his church stood.95 When the pastor, Zhang Shaojie, 
refused to comply with government orders, he was arrested.96 
Although Zhang was a pastor for a TPSM church and had operated 
within the law, officials designated the church as a “heretical cult,” 
disbanded the organization, and charged Zhang and several 
followers with crimes under Article 300 for participating in an illegal 
cult.97 
The suppression of Christian organizations, even legally 
recognized organizations, also took place on a greater scale in 
Zhejiang Province during 2014. The first major incident took place 
in April, when the government demolished a $4.7 million chapel 
that was recently built by a legally recognized TPSM church.98 
Although the government had previously approved of the 
construction of the church building, government officials 
inexplicably declared the building illegal and ordered its 
demolition.99 The demolition of Christian structures has continued 
since June 2014, when local officials began destroying crosses on 
Christian churches and detaining any religious believers who defy the 
removal orders.100 Chinese officials claim that these crosses were 
 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1529931/1500-cult-members-arrested-china-
says-after-woman-beaten-death-mcdonalds. 
 95. Tom Philips, Christian Leader Jailed for 12 Years amid Chinese Church Crackdown, 
THE TELEGRAPH (July 4, 2014), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10945422/Christian-leader-
jailed-for-12-years-amid-Chinese-church-crackdown.html. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. See infra note 169 and accompanying text describing the enactment of Article 
300. 
 98. Zoe Li, China Denies Church Demolition Is Persecution of Christians, CNN WORLD 
(May 2, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/world/asia/china-church-
demolished/index.html?hpt=hp_t2. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Andrew Jacobs, China Removes Crosses from Two More Churches in Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/asia/china-moves-
against-2-churches-in-campaign-against-christianity.html?_r=0. 
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removed and buildings destroyed as a response to violations of 
zoning ordinances.101 Some sources state that these crackdowns are 
part of a recently issued but unpublished directive to “eradicate” 
unregistered gray market religious organizations within the next ten 
years.102 A recently released statement by Wang Zuoan, the Director 
of SARA, where Wang states that China will soon redefine Chinese 
Christian theology to be more compatible with socialism103 confirms 
that there has been a recent shift in policy, although the exact 
purpose or effect of this change may not be understood for years. 
The renewed repression of religious beliefs is not limited to 
repression of Christian religious organizations. China also received 
substantial criticism when officials in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang 
Province forbade school children and government employees from 
fasting during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month.104 According to 
some sources, those who refused to comply with the ban from 
fasting were force fed by government officials.105 These restrictions 
contributed to a significant increase in violence and unrest in the 
region that led to the deaths of hundreds of Muslims and resulted in 
further restrictions, such as bans against beards and religious clothing 
on public buses.106 
 
 101. Ian Johnson, Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around a Toppled Spire, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/asia/church-state-
clash-in-china-coalesces-around-a-toppled-spire.html. 
 102. Katrina Lantos Swett & M. Zuhdi Jasser, Commentary: China’s Grim Religious 
Freedom Problem, WASH. POST (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/commentary-chinas-grim-religious-
freedom-problem/2014/07/29/bf5133e0-1756-11e4-88f7-96ed767bb747_story.html. 
 103. China Plans Establishment of Christian Theology, CHINA DAILY, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/07/content_18262927.htm (last updated 
Aug. 7, 2014). 
 104. Ishaan Tharoor, China’s War on Ramadan Sees Muslim Students Forced to Break 
Fast, WASH. POST (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/11/chinas-war-on-
ramadan-sees-muslim-students-forced-to-break-fast/. 
 105. Kabita Maharana, Ramadan 2014: China Force Feeds Muslim Students to Break Fast 
During Holy Month, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 12, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ramadan-
2014-china-force-feeds-muslim-students-break-fast-during-holy-month-1456367. 
 106. China: 96 Killed Last Week in Xinjiang, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/02/china-96-killed-last-week-in-
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II. THE CURRENT RELIGIOUS REGULATORY SYSTEM OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Structurally, there has been little change from the regulatory 
structure re-established in the early 1980s. The national-level 
Religious Affairs Bureau has since been renamed the State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (“SARA”), though the name 
remains unchanged at other administrative levels.107 Religious 
associations seeking legal entity status are subject to the jurisdiction 
of several executive agencies, generally including both SARA or the 
appropriate RAB and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which administers 
the affairs of social organizations.108 Additionally, all religious 
organizations that are not affiliated with a Patriotic Religious 
Association (and some that are) receive some oversight from the 
Ministry of Public Security, which is the public police administration 
in China.109 This is because religious organizations that are not 
recognized as sub-entities to a patriotic religious association do not 
have any legal entity status within China.110 The Ministry of Public 
Security exercises some jurisdictional oversight over these 
organizations as “illegal groups.” Finally, the PRC State Department 
has created the Institute of World Religions (“IWR”) as a 
department within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(“CASS”). The IWR is a state-sponsored think-tank that produces 
scholarship and research on religion policies and practices.111 This 
 
xinjiang/13532061/; Chinese City Bans Islamic Beards, Headwear, and Clothing on Buses, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/06/chinese-city-bans-islamic-beards-head
wear-and-clothing-on-buses. 
 107. See CHRISTOPHER MARSH, RELIGION AND THE STATE IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: 
SUPPRESSION, SURVIVAL, AND REVIVAL 211 (2011). 
 108. See KIM-KWONG CHAN & ERIC R. CARLSON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CHINA: 
POLICY, ADMINISTRATION, AND REGULATION 10–11 (2005). 
 109. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the current Chinese religious regulatory structure, 
see id. 
 110. While it is not expressly forbidden for a religious organization to be granted legal 
entity status in the PRC without aligning with a Patriotic Religious Association, there are no 
such groups who have been granted legal entity status. 
 111. VINCENT GOOSSAERT & DAVID A. PALMER, THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION IN 
MODERN CHINA 321 (2011). 
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section will provide a more in-depth view of the current religious 
regulatory system in China. 112 
A. The Communist Party of China and Religious Regulation 
As discussed in the previous sections, the CPC is the ruling 
political party in China. Currently the Party structure responsible for 
monitoring and regulating religion in China is the United Front 
Work Department. Within the UFWD, the Second Department of 
the UFWD specifically oversees Religious and Minority Affairs in the 
PRC. 
The UFWD is a department that operates under the direct 
supervision of the CPC’s Central Committee,113 which oversees the 
national structure of the CPC.114 Within the Second Department 
there are three major divisions: one managing religion, one 
managing minority affairs, and the third is a “personnel office.”115 
Within the religious division there are several offices that specialize in 
managing the religious affairs of different religions. Each office has 
between four and eight cadres. This division, and each respective 
office, has the responsibility of creating religious policy based on the 
directives of Party leaders in the Central Committee or higher 
bodies.116 
While the control the CPC has over religious affairs is more 
appropriately explored in the following sections that deal with the 
PRC regulatory structure and the government-sponsored private 
organizations, the role of the Party and the UFWD in regulating 
 
 112. For a graphical representation of the current religious regulatory system in China, 
see infra Figure 2. 
 113. LAWRENCE R. SULLIVAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTY 266 (2012). 
 114. Id. at 43–44. 
 115. Chinese: 人事部             (renshibu). Though renshibu is typically translated as “human 
resources department,” the renshibu in the Second Department fills a very different role. The 
renshibu does not handle the employee affairs of the Second Department; instead, the renshibu 
controls the advancement and selection of religious leaders and personnel. To avoid confusion, 
it has been suggested this alternate translation is appropriate. 
 116. All information is based on personal communications with former cadres of the 
UFWD. 
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religious affairs ought not to be overlooked. All control and decision 
making pertaining to the religious regulatory system is held by the 
Party and the UFWD. Thus, the CPC regulatory structure could be 
thought of as the “brain” of the Chinese regulatory system. All 
actions carried out by the PRC regulatory structure, and ultimately 
all actions and doctrine of official Chinese religious organizations, 
originate in the policy statements from CPC leadership and the 
UFWD. Any organization hoping to affect or influence Chinese 
religious policy should focus efforts on this decision-making locus of 
the Chinese religious regulatory system. 
B. The People’s Republic of China and Religious Regulation 
The People’s Republic of China refers to the government 
structure of China. It is notable that the constitution of the PRC 
stipulates that the PRC is to operate “under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong Thought.”117 Therefore, while the PRC regulatory 
structure is the “face” of religious regulation, it might be 
appropriately thought of as the body of religious regulation in 
China—inseparable from the “mind” (the CPC), but unable to act 
absent command from the CPC. The PRC government acts as an 
agent of the CPC leadership and the methods of CPC control will be 
outlined in this section. 
Similar to the structure of the U.S. government, the PRC has 
several branches of government. It is notable that the role of the 
legislative branch of the PRC, the National People’s Congress, is 
“[t]o enact and amend statutes”;118 however, to date, the National 
People’s Congress has failed to pass any legislation protecting 
religious freedom. This is significant because it means that all 
religious regulation that is done through agency regulation, which is 
less authoritative than legislative statutes, cannot be appealed 
through the judicial system until after the agency-provided appeals 
process has been exhausted, and depends in greater part on agency 
discretion for enforcement. The State Department is the executive 
branch of the PRC and is the main source of religious regulation in 
 
 117. XIANFA Preamble (1982) (China). 
 118. Id. art. 67, § 2. 
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the PRC. Several agencies within the State Department have 
influence on religious regulation: SARA, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(“MCA”), and the Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”). 
SARA was organized shortly after the establishment of the PRC 
and is accountable to both the State Department and the UFWD.119 
Specifically, the State Department oversees “business matters”—
things like budgets, payroll, etc.—while the UFWD oversees “policy 
matters”—things like agency regulations, administrative approvals, 
etc.120 Within SARA there are nine departments.121 Among the 
general bureaucratic offices are the four business departments, with 
each business department being responsible for overseeing specific 
religious organizations. The first business department oversees 
Buddhism and Taoism;122 the second, Catholicism and 
Protestantism;123 the third, Islam;124 and the fourth, other 
religions.125 These business departments are responsible for drafting 
regulations and overseeing the administrative approvals for religions 
within their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, each business department houses a CPC Party 
Branch to which all Party members belong. During weekly Party 
Branch meetings, the Party Branch Secretary relays policy 
information from the UFWD to SARA officers. SARA is the 
national-level organization for religious affairs. Below SARA at the 
province, county, city, etc., levels are the Religious Affairs Bureaus 
(“RABs”). Depending on their location, the amount of funding, and 
the religious population, RABs may or may not have separate 
 
 119. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 70–71. 
 120. Information is based on personal communications with former cadres of the UFWD. 
 121. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 122. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywys /index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 123. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywes/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 124. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywss/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 125. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywss2/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
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business departments to oversee certain religious groups. In other 
areas where funds are insufficient to operate these parallel entities, 
the RAB does not exist and the UFWD directly fills the role of the 
RAB.126 The MCA also plays a role in regulating religious affairs as it 
oversees all social organizations.127 While the MCA does not issue 
religion-specific regulations, all religious organizations are subject to 
the same regulations as all other social organizations. Thus, the PRC 
maintains a dual oversight over legally organized religious groups. 
Some legally organized religious groups are also subject to oversight 
by other government agencies where the State Department 
determines that the activities of the religious organization fall within 
the jurisdiction of the agency. For instance, many Taoist temples 
receive oversight from the China National Tourism Administration, 
and not by SARA.128 In August 2014, one Buddhist temple seeking 
to avoid an edict by the local government to open its doors to 
tourists instead shut down operations.129 
The MPS is a PRC agency tasked with maintaining public order. 
The role of the MPS is similar to the role of the FBI in the United 
States; accordingly, the MPS should theoretically involve itself in 
legally organized religious groups’ affairs only when there has been 
criminal conduct. However, the MPS’s involvement in religious 
affairs is far more extensive. This is because the PRC government has 
been very restrictive in its allowance of religious groups to obtain 
legal-entity status. To date, only eight religious associations have 
obtained legal-entity status.130 Thus, every religious group that exists 
outside of these eight associations is an “illegal group” that falls 
within the jurisdiction of the MPS. Many of the reports of 
 
 126. CHAN & CARLSON, supra note 108, at 11–12. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Xu Yunpeng, Unregulated Commercialization: How Does this Lead to Nirvana?, 
CHINA ECON. NET (Aug. 18, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://views.ce.cn/view/ent/
201408/18/t20140818_3372616.shtml. 
 129. Lu Chen, Buddhist Temple in China Shuts Doors to Avoid Tourists, EPOCH TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/886583-buddhist-temple-
in-china-shuts-doors-to-avoid-tourists/. 
 130. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 222–23; see also 
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900. 
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infringements on religious rights specify that the persecution was 
done by agents of the MPS.131 
Interagency disputes between the MPS, MCA, and SARA have 
been reported, resulting in some religious groups receiving different 
directives and treatment from different agencies. This is in part due 
to the status of SARA as a government administration, rather than a 
ministry. Because a ministry holds higher power within the Chinese 
bureaucratic system, MPS agents have been reported to ignore SARA 
directives in their suppression of groups the MPS deems illegal.132 
This inter-agency conflict is further complicated by what has been 
referred to as the “stove-piping effect.”133 The stove-piping effect is a 
bureaucratic phenomenon “in which individual ministries and other 
hierarchies share information up and down the chain of command, 
but not horizontally with each other.”134 Thus, local Public Security, 
Civil Affairs, and RAB officials are likely not aware of the conflict in 
policies for the treatment of certain religious groups. 
The CPC maintains control over these several government 
agencies through the Party Branches that exist within individual 
departments and offices, as well as through the nomenklatura 
system.135 Nomenklatura was derived from the Soviet model of 
Communism and describes the practice of the CPC of strategically 
appointing important officials to both Party and PRC government 
posts.136 As the CPC has exclusive control over the appointment of 
certain positions, PRC officials are loyal to the Party, as opposed to 
being loyal to the government or the people. Through both the 
nomenklatura system and the Party Branches, the CPC maintains 
absolute control over the PRC government. Thus, the PRC 
 
 131. See CHAN & CARLSON, supra note 108. 
 132. Id. 
 133. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 10 (2012). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Hon S. Chan, Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 
1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703 (2004). 
 136. Id. 
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government is in effect an agent of the CPC, working only to actuate 
the policies of the CPC leadership. 
 
  
Figure 2.1 – A graphical representation of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese 
government structures (in Simplified Chinese). 
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Figure 2.2 - A graphical representation of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese 
government structures (in English). 
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C. Official Patriotic Religious Associations and Religious Regulations 
The Patriotic Religious Associations that were created in the 
1950s and recreated in the 1980s remain the only officially legal 
avenue for religious practice. Today, the eight Patriotic Religious 
Associations are the only legally recognized religious organizations in 
China.137 There are also only five recognized religions in China: 
Buddhism, Taoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. These 
five recognized religions coincide with the first three of SARA’s 
business departments,138 leaving all other “cults,” “illegal groups,” or 
“non-recognized religious groups” to be governed by the remaining 
fourth business department. 
The Patriotic Religious Associations have a large following, 
though generally not as large as the following of their 
“underground” counterparts.139 However, the Patriotic Religious 
Associations serve an important role in religious regulation in China. 
Similar to the PRC, the Patriotic Religious Associations are subject 
to CPC power by nomenklatura. Leaders of the Patriotic Religious 
Associations are chosen by the Personnel Office of the Second 
Department of the UFWD. Even after leaders have been appointed 
by the UFWD, the UFWD disperses policy and doctrinal statements 
that leaders are expected to adhere to. Religious leaders have also 
been required to attend “training sessions” to learn about the 
confluence of their religion and Communist doctrine. After these 
training sessions the leaders take a written test, and if they fail they 
are removed from their post.140 
Though many Chinese do not attend the official Patriotic 
Churches, these Patriotic Religious Associations establish a legal 
outlet for religious expression that the CPC and PRC can control. 
CPC and PRC officials use the existence of these officially 
recognized religions to deflect claims by domestic and international 
 
 137. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 222–23; see also 
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900. 
 138. See supra notes 124–126. 
 139. See Hongyi, supra note 81, at 48 (stating that in the early 1990s it was estimated 
that less than one-fifth of Catholics in China attended the officially recognized Patriotic 
Church). 
 140. ROBERT KUHN, HOW CHINA’S LEADERS THINK: THE INSIDE STORY OF CHINA’S 
REFORM AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE 371–72 (2010). 
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human rights critics, by claiming that the Chinese have the freedom 
to join any religious organization, so long as it is an organization the 
Party approves. Because there is a legal outlet for religious 
observance, official CPC and PRC policy has been to suppress any 
religious groups that do not belong to these officially recognized 
associations.141 However, it is not practicably possible for the 
UFWD, SARA, or MPS to suppress all illegal groups; thus, a large 
number of religious groups operate outside the law within a range of 
tolerance from enforcing officials. Still, there are many more groups 
that are actively denounced in CPC policy and suppressed by PRC 
officials. 
D. The Three-Market Model and Religious Regulation 
In a 2006 article, Yang Fenggang explained the current religious 
market in China with his “three-market model.”142 The Chinese 
religious market consists of three markets: the red market, the black 
market, and the gray market. The red market is the legal market for 
religious worship. This is the legal outlet for religious observance 
that the CPC and PRC have created through the establishment of 
the Patriotic Religious Associations, which is overseen by the RABs, 
SARA, and the UFWD.143 The black market is the illegal market. 
Often referred to as “evil cults” in CPC statements, these are the 
groups that are actively denounced by the CPC and actively 
suppressed by the PRC through the MPS.144 Perhaps the most well-
known of these groups is the Falun Gong, discussed below.145 
Yang defines the gray market narrowly as simply those members 
of legally recognized religious groups acting outside the law146—for 
example, members of the legally recognized Protestant church who 
proselytize off of church premises.147 However, a much larger 
 
 141. Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts, supra note 74, at 187. 
 142. See Yang, supra note 70, at 93. 
 143. Id. at 97. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 256. 
 146. See Yang, supra note 70, at 97. 
 147. Id at 109. 
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segment of religious observance should be categorized as operating 
within the gray market. This segment is comprised of those religious 
groups who operate without legal protection, but whose practice is 
tolerated by the CPC and PRC. Examples of these groups could 
include local Buddhist, Taoist, or Shamanistic temples, Uyghur 
Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, certain underground Protestant and 
Catholic churches, and religions that have no recognition in the 
PRC, such as the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Baha’i. These 
groups should be categorized as operating within the gray market 
because they operate within a zone of legal uncertainty. So long as 
they ruffle no feathers, they are allowed to hold religious services 
and, in some cases, even own land. However, they have no legal 
rights; they exist by the grace and tolerance of enforcing officials, 
making their existence tenuous at best.148 
In his explanation of the Chinese religious market, Yang makes 
three propositions. First, “[t]o the extent that religious organizations 
are restricted in number and in operation, a black market will emerge 
in spite of high costs to individuals.”149 Second, “[t]o the extent that 
a red market is restricted and a black market is suppressed, a gray 
market will emerge.”150 And third, “[t]he more restrictive and 
suppressive the regulation, the larger the gray market.”151 Yang does 
well to prove each proposition; however, the remainder of this 
Comment will prove an additional proposition: To the extent that 
admittance into the red market is restricted, a large gray market will 
eventually lead to the emergence of a larger black market.152 
III. CPC AND PRC POLICY AND THE RED, GRAY, AND BLACK 
MARKETS: A CASE STUDY 
The history of the Falun Gong in the PRC illustrates this final 
proposition. The Falun Gong is a quasi-religious qigong group that 
has been brutally suppressed by the CPC and PRC authorities for the 
past decade. Qigong is a process for meditation, self-cultivation, and 
 
 148. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 256–57. 
 149. See Yang, supra note 70, at 98. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 99. 
 152. Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 257. 
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paraphysical healing.153 It is often practiced through meditation, 
breathing techniques, and slow-motion martial arts. Qigong has 
existed in China long before the post-Cultural Revolution 
resurgence of qigong groups. Jiang Weiqiao (1873–1958) was an 
influential leader of secularizing the qigong techniques that existed in 
Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.154 In the 1950s the CPC was 
very open to the practice of qigong, seeing it as a science and type of 
Chinese medicine.155 In 1950 alone, over seventy qigong groups 
were founded and established as legal-entities within the PRC.156 
Beginning in 1979, literally tens of thousands of Chinese 
declared themselves qigong masters and began to organize qigong 
groups.157 Some of these groups were rather large, building 
“education centers,” “research centers,” and hundreds to thousands 
of “cultivation points.”158 There was perhaps nothing unique about 
the Falun Gong when they first organized in 1992. The Falun Gong 
registered with the China Qigong Research Society to form a legal 
entity.159 So long as they conformed to the limits against religious 
practice, they could operate within the red market of social 
organizations. However, as Falun Gong spread across China, their 
message adopted increasingly religious overtones.160 Thus, the Falun 
Gong transitioned from the red market to the gray market. For a few 
years the Falun Gong retained their status as a legal social 
organization, but operated outside the law by practicing religion. 
Practically, the Falun Gong had no choice but to operate within the 
gray market because China only recognizes five religions and the 
Patriotic Religious Associations described above—any other religious 
group is considered an “evil cult” and suppressed.161 By 1996, the 
 
 153. See GOOSSAERT & PALMER, supra note 111, at 117. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 120. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Yang, supra note 70, at 111. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Beatrice Leung, China and the Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the 
Modern Era, 33 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 761, 767 (2003) [hereinafter Leung, Falun Gong]. 
 160. See Yang, supra note 70, at 113. 
 161. See Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 764. 
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Falun Gong’s religious message became too overt for the MCA and 
the China Qigong Research Society to ignore and the Falun Gong’s 
legal-entity status was revoked. 
There are two important observations to make about the Falun 
Gong between 1996 and 1999. First, the Falun Gong lacked 
designation as a legal entity, yet continued to function—largely 
without CPC or PRC interference.162 Second, because of the lack of 
legal-entity status, the CPC and PRC were left without many options 
for regulating the activities of the Falun Gong.163 Because the MCA 
and China Qigong Research Society had dissolved the Falun Gong’s 
status as a legal-entity, they no longer had prerogative to monitor or 
limit the actions of the Falun Gong. While the MPS could be 
enlisted to disband the group, the Falun Gong were not yet seen as a 
threat to CPC and PRC power or social stability, and the negative 
international reaction to the forceful suppression of a peaceful group 
served as a deterrent for such an extreme measure. Because of these 
factors, the Falun Gong fell through the cracks of religious 
regulation and were able to operate essentially unregulated. This 
existence in legal uncertainty—existing without legal rights, but 
within the scope of tolerance of CPC and PRC officials—is the 
definition of a group operating within the gray market of religious 
regulation, which is why these organizations should also be properly 
understood as groups within the gray market defined by Yang. 
It was this operation within the gray market, beyond the careful 
watch of CPC and PRC structures for controlling social groups, that 
allowed the Falun Gong to grow rapidly.164 By 1999, the Falun 
Gong had grown to a membership of over 2.1 million known 
members.165 Of those, approximately one-third, or 700,000, were 
also members of the CPC.166 On April 25, 1999, an estimated 
10,000 to 30,000 Falun Gong members encircled the CPC 
headquarters in Beijing to protest the refusal of SARA to allow the 
Falun Gong to register as a religious group. PRC President and 
 
 162. See Yang, supra note 70, at 113. 
 163. See Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 779. 
 164. Id. at 779–80. 
 165. THOMAS LUM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHINA AND FALUN GONG 3 
(2006). 
 166. Id. 
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General Secretary of the CPC, Jiang Zemin, was “shocked by the 
affront to Party authority and ordered a crackdown.”167 
The Party response came on July 21, 1999, when Jiang Zemin 
issued a directive to dissolve the Falun Gong and arrest the 
leadership.168 Through examining this Party response to an external 
threat, the Party’s control over the PRC government apparatus and 
“private” entities becomes glaringly apparent. The Renmin Ribao 
[People’s Daily] is the Chinese national newspaper, yet reports 
directly to the Central Committee of the CPC. The Renmin Ribao 
was quick to describe the Falun Gong movement as the most serious 
political incident since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.169 The 
PRC’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress, also 
responded by amending an “anti-cult law,” known as Article 300, 
that was effective retroactively, labeling the Falun Gong as an “evil 
cult,” and giving the MPS authority to suppress the group.170 Soon 
thereafter, several other qigong groups were similarly labeled as “evil 
cults” and were similarly suppressed.171 Within the first two years of 
the crackdown, between 150 and 450 group leaders were arrested 
and sentenced to prison terms of up to twenty years.172 Under Party 
direction, the MPC also detained between 10,000 and 100,000 
practitioners and forced them to serve one to three year terms in 
“labor re-education” camps. According to PRC law, “labor re-
education” is not a criminal punishment, but an administrative 
punishment, enforced by the State Council or ministries within the 
State Council (such as the MPS). Therefore, citizens may be 
detained in “labor re-education” camps for up to three years without 
being charged with a crime and without trial.173 
 
 167. Id. at 4. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 763. 
 170. LUM, supra note 165, at 4. See supra Part I.D. for a brief discussion of recent 
application of article 300 in the PRC. 
 171. Yang, supra note 70, at 113. 
 172. LUM, supra note 165, at 4. 
 173. Id. at 5. 
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Since the CPC’s edict that the Falun Gong is an “evil cult,” there 
has been an ongoing struggle between the Falun Gong and the 
CPC. The Falun Gong has continued to release reports about 
arrests, tortures, and executions done by order of CPC and PRC 
officials.174 Meanwhile, reports are released periodically of Falun 
Gong protests in the PRC, including, most notably, the staging of 
self-immolations in public places.175 Despite Party and State efforts 
to suppress the movement, the Falun Gong has not been eradicated. 
The group continues to operate in China within the religious black 
market.176 Gradually, as more groups have been added to the CPC’s 
list of “evil cults”177 and have been similarly suppressed, these groups 
have similarly moved operations underground into the black market. 
IV. MEETING PARTY AND STATE INTERESTS THROUGH A MORE 
EFFECTIVE REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
The difficulties the CPC and PRC have had in dealing with the 
Falun Gong and other “evil cults” serves as proof that the current 
religious regulatory system has failed to meet CPC and PRC 
interests.178 The main interest of the CPC is maintaining179 as 
evidenced by the increased funding towards maintaining social 
stability is strong evidence that the CPC views their ability to 
maintain social stability as one of the most important keys to 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 779; see also J. David Goodman, A Self-
Immolation in Tiananmen Square Is Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011) 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-self-immolation-in-tiananmen-square-is-
reported/ (describing the self-immolation attempt in Tiananmen Square and discussing past 
self-immolations done by members of the Falun Gong); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Former Falun 
Gong Followers Enlisted in China’s War on Sect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/05/world/former-falun-gong-followers-enlisted-in-
china-s-war-on-sect.html (describing the self-immolation attempts in Tiananmen Square of 
people who claimed to be part of the Falun Gong). 
 176. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 781. 
 177. For a partial list of groups banned as “evil cults” as of 2006, see Yang, supra note 
70, at 107–08. 
 178. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 257. 
 179. See Russell Leigh Moses, So Much for Stability: Reality Catching Up With the 
Communist Party, CHINA REAL TIME REP., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/05/so-much-for-stability-reality-catching-up-
to-the-communist-party/. 
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retaining power over the Chinese people. In 2009, funding towards 
maintaining social stability nearly matched the funding of the Party 
military.180 Since 2009, funding towards maintaining domestic 
stability has increased by 11.5 percent.181 Traditionally, the CPC has 
seen religious organizations, or any social organization other than 
the CPC, as a threat to CPC power because these groups have the 
ability to indoctrinate organization members and mobilize these 
members for their own purposes.182 
In an attempt to prevent religious organizations from serving as 
an incubator for anti-Communist ideologists to use in breeding 
social unrest, the CPC created the current system of control with the 
hope that it would create a highly-regulated legal outlet for religious 
observance.183 By creating CPC-controlled religious associations, the 
CPC had hoped to be able to control religious practice from the top 
down; by creating the PRC’s SARA and RABs, the CPC hoped to 
control religious practice from the bottom up. However, the CPC’s 
primary method of maintaining control over religious groups—
strictly limiting the number of religious groups and controlling the 
leadership of the groups—is one of the main contributors to the 
failure of this system of control. Ultimately, the failure of this 
regulatory system is the inability of the CPC and PRC to effectively 
regulate groups who do not fit within the narrowly-defined 
categories the system is meant to control.184 Using Yang Fenggang’s 
model, the current religious regulatory system is able to regulate 
groups within the red market, and has structures in place to suppress 
the groups operating in the black market. However, this regulatory 
system has no method to regulate groups within the gray market—
both those that exist as “radical branches,” or red-market 
 
 180. Cheng Li, The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment 
of Shifting Power in China, 211 CHINA Q. 595, 616–17 (2012). 
 181. Id. at 617. 
 182. Thomas David DuBois, Religion and the Chinese State: Three Crises and a Solution, 
64 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 344, 347 (2010); Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 257. 
 183. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 779. 
 184. Id. 
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organizations acting in violation of the law, and those in the gray 
market that are tolerated by officials despite having no legal entity.185 
Ironically, while the CPC sought to control religious 
organizations to prevent radical groups in fomenting social unrest, 
the gray market that has been created by the current regulatory 
system has the effect of fomenting this exact type of social unrest. 
Under the current regulatory system, groups that exist within the 
gray market have three options: first, they can join the legal red 
market if they are willing to appoint Party-approved leaders, adopt 
Communist-defined doctrine, and become a part of a patriotic 
religious association; second, they can continue to operate within the 
gray market indefinitely; or third, they can radicalize and join the 
black market. Currently, groups who attempt to make the transition 
from the gray to red market have only one choice—to submit to the 
leadership of a Patriotic Religious Association and, ultimately, to the 
Communist Party itself. Needless to say, this option is less than 
appealing to the vast majority of religious groups as it would require 
the group to accept CPC-initiated changes in its leadership and 
doctrine.186 
The majority of religious groups operating within the gray 
market naturally opt to attempt to continue operations within the 
gray market. However, the CPC and PRC’s attempt to substitute 
tolerance of the religious group for legal recognition of the religious 
organization is not only theoretically problematic,187 but also 
practically problematic for the CPC and PRC as well. First, 
organizations that exist within the gray market have no legal-entity 
status. While this does limit the ability of the group to organize and 
operate, this also is very problematic for reporting and regulation. As 
these organizations are already operating outside of the law, they 
rarely, if ever, conform to reporting procedures designed to assist the 
RAB in regulation of the religious group. Moreover, even if a group 
were to obtain the permission of the local RAB to assemble, there is 
no reporting process within the RAB or codified methods of RAB 
 
 185. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 257–58. 
 186. See id. at 258. 
 187. See W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: 
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 433 (2010) (describing these 
theoretical problems in a Moldovan case). 
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surveillance or regulation of these groups that exist within the local 
RAB’s zone of tolerance.188 
Second, religious organizations that operate within the gray 
market cannot operate within the gray market indefinitely.189 The 
Falun Gong is an excellent example of the inability of an unregulated 
group to exist within the CPC’s zone of tolerance indefinitely. The 
CPC crackdown on the Falun Gong had several motivations, but 
among them was the fear of a social organization the size of the 
Falun Gong that had the ability to mobilize so many citizens to their 
cause. However, at 2.1 million members, the Falun Gong was still 
(relative to China) a small group.190 Moreover, the vast majority of 
members participated in Falun Gong out of curiosity, for health 
benefits, or for socialization and had no intention to participate in 
social disruption.191 Yet somehow this organization was able to scare 
top CPC and PRC officials into a response that would eventually 
become every bit as infamous as responses in Tiananmen, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang. Furthermore, religious organizations with far fewer 
adherents, such as the Shouwang Church in Beijing, have been 
blacklisted and persecuted under Article 300’s “anti-cult” 
provisions.192 In the case of both the Shouwang and the Falun Gong, 
CPC crackdowns came after CPC leadership became suddenly aware 
of a well-organized group that was previously unknown. These 
groups had been able to expand and organize without alerting CPC 
authorities because of the existence of the gray market. Groups that 
seek to continue to operate within the gray market indefinitely will 
 
 188. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 258. 
 189. Id. at 258–59. 
 190. Twelve years after the establishment of the Falun Gong, membership totaled 2.1 
million. The Underground Catholic Church boasted approximately 6 million members within 
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 192. For example, the Shouwang Church is an Underground Protestant Church with 
only around 1,000 members, yet this group was blacklisted in 2010 when the CPC discovered 
that the Shouwang were preparing to send approximately 200 leaders to an international 
evangelical conference. See Ursula Gauthier, Why Do Christian Groups in China Put Authorities 
on Red Alert?, TIME, June 2011, available at 
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always be at risk that CPC authorities will be suddenly alerted to the 
group’s activities and will label the group an “evil cult,” making the 
choice to stay within the gray market impossible.193 
Groups operating within the gray market also foment social 
unrest when group members become frustrated with their treatment 
under the law. As the economy has slowed, many members of the 
middle class, who have stopped profiting from the country’s 
economic success, have turned to gray market religious organizations 
to fulfill their basic needs.194 However, the CPC’s current system of 
regulation suppresses these gray market organizations, and recent 
studies in China suggest that when “middle-class Chinese begin to 
feel that their voices are being suppressed, that their access to 
information is unjustly being blocked or that their space for social 
action is being unduly confined, increased political dissent may begin 
to take shape.”195 Studies have also shown that this political dissent 
within the middle class has increased in recent years as the economy 
has slowed.196 
The gray market directly contributes to the social unrest the 
current regulatory system is intended to prevent as groups operating 
within the gray market transition into the black market, whether 
voluntarily or by edict of CPC officials. By both marginalizing and 
actively suppressing these groups, the CPC creates the very type of 
opposition groups the religious regulatory system was intended to 
obviate. In the case of the Falun Gong, suppression efforts by the 
CPC and PRC that marginalized group members had drastic 
consequences. Adherents who initially attended Falun Gong 
activities for health benefits or socialization197 became radicals who 
believed that “[t]o suffer and even die for the promotion of Falun 
Gong is regarded as a golden opportunity for self-fulfillment and 
should be embraced with gratitude.”198 “Like the Holy War in the 
Islamic faith, to die for the religious cause is a martyrdom bec[ome] 
 
 193. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 258–59. 
 194. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 771–72. 
 195. Li, supra note 180, at 606. 
 196. Id.; Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 259. 
 197. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 766. 
 198. Id. at 780. 
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a way to obtain the ultimate fulfillment of life.”199 And, since the 
crackdown on the Falun Gong movement, there have been many 
who sacrificed their life fighting against the CPC and PRC 
suppression of the Falun Gong. The sad irony of the situation is that 
these people and groups became radicalized in response to the 
system of regulation the CPC set up to prevent radical groups and 
people from disrupting public order.200 
It is also untenable for the PRC to continue to regulate religion 
under this paradigm, even if there were radical changes in CPC 
policy and groups were no longer actively suppressed under Article 
300. Theoretically, Chinese officials could decline to suppress gray-
market groups, even when they expand beyond the current zone of 
tolerance they operate within. However, the result of this system, 
even if it was better than the status quo, would be a patchwork of 
decentralized and unequal religious regulation as officials from 
different regions would enforce their own laws. Whereas the current 
religious regulatory system was created in order to centralize control 
over religion, this development would only undermine Chinese 
interests. 
Therefore, the CPC and PRC would be best served by altering 
the current system of religious regulation instead of simply selectively 
enforcing it. While ultimately many human rights advocates and 
western Christians hope that China will ultimately implement a 
wide-sweeping change that would grant all citizens religious 
freedom, such a drastic change is very unlikely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. However, a less drastic change could be successful 
in preventing additional black market groups from undermining 
social stability. Thus, the PRC should instead alter current practice 
and allow for gray market religious organizations to receive legal 
recognition without submitting to the authority of the patriotic 
religious associations. If gray market religious organizations were 
provided with an opportunity to register as legal organizations, there 
would be an incentive for these religious organizations to obey 
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religious regulations. Moreover, after granting legal entity status, 
SARA and the PRC would have more tools to regulate the newly-
legalized religious organizations—tools that are not as blunt and 
heavy-handed as the current practice of prosecuting organizations 
and believers under Article 300. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
There has been much criticism of the religious regulatory system 
of the CPC and PRC. The CPC has built a framework of controlling 
agencies and exercised power over the legal “red market” of religious 
activity through the use of these agencies and the nomeklatura 
system. The design of the CPC in creating these devices for control 
has been to ensure Communist control over religious organizations 
to prevent these groups from incubating anti-Communist groups 
and subverting Communist control over the Chinese people. 
This system of regulation and control has had success in bringing 
a certain segment of religious organizations under CPC control. 
However, a large “gray market” of religious organizations also exists 
within China. These organizations exist outside of the boundaries of 
the religious regulatory system of the PRC. Because officials are 
unwilling or unable to enforce the harsh regulations the PRC has 
established for dealing with all groups that operate outside the 
religious regulatory system, this religious gray market has grown to 
become extremely large. While official policy has been to suppress 
these groups absolutely, many groups operate within a range of 
tolerance established ad hoc by local enforcing officials. These 
groups that operate outside of the religious regulatory system often 
operate under limited or no supervision by PRC officials. 
This status quo of allowances, tolerances, and crackdowns cannot 
continue. The current religious regulatory system has no methods 
for groups operating within the gray market to legalize their 
activities. Furthermore, as can be shown by the transition of religious 
groups such as the Falun Gong and Shouwang Church, which were 
previously tolerated by officials and operated within the gray market, 
organizations that operate within the gray market cannot hope to 
continue within the gray market indefinitely. As gray market 
organizations expand, CPC officials eventually forfeit tolerance and 
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criminalize these groups’ activities. Groups that are forced into the 
black market contribute to social unrest, becoming the types of 
groups that the current religious regulatory system was intended to 
prevent. 
CPC and PRC officials must address these problems, as the gray 
market will continue to expand and the potential for future unrest 
will increase. The best way for CPC officials to prevent gray-market 
religious organizations from joining the black market is to create a 
method for gray market religious organizations to legalize their 
organizations and join the red market without having to submit to 
controls on doctrine and leadership. If CPC officials implement this 
change into the current system, legitimate religious organizations 
will enter the legal market, allowing for the religious regulatory 
system to properly regulate these groups, which will prevent these 
groups from being forced into the black market.201 
As CPC officials often cite to historical examples of unrest and 
rebellion as reasons that religion must be suppressed and controlled, 
they should also hearken back to the failure of policies implemented 
by the Qing Emperor in quelling social unrest among the Muslims. 
Then, a Manchu official warned the Emperor: “Among the 
Moslems, there are certainly evil ones, but doubtless, there are also 
numerous peaceful, law-abiding people. If we decide to destroy them 
all, we are driving the good ones to join the rebels, and create for 
ourselves an awesome, endless job of killing the Moslems.”202 Today, 
CPC officials ought to note that their continued attempts to 
suppress religious activities will only drive law-abiding people to join 
the law-breakers, creating an “awesome, endless job” of suppressing 
dissident groups. 
Carl Hollan* 
  
 
 201. Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 265-66. 
 202. WEN-DJANG CHU, THE MOSLEM REBELLION IN NORTHWEST CHINA 1862–1878: 
A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT MINORITY POLICY 57 (1966). 
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